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Recent Developments 
Atkins v. Virginia: 
Imposing the Death Penalty on Mentally Retarded Offenders is Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Prohibited by the Eighth Amendment 
I n a six-to-three decision, the United States Supreme 
Court held imposing the death 
penalty on mentally retarded 
offenders was cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Atkins v. Virginia, 
122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002). The Court 
found a national consensus 
indicating that the death penalty 
should not be imposed on less 
morally culpable people. 
Furthermore, the Court conducted 
an independent evaluation and 
found that mentally retarded persons 
had diminished culpability and, 
therefore, the reasons underpinning 
the death penalty did not apply and 
mentally retarded persons faced a 
special risk of execution. 
In August 1996, Daryl Renard 
Atkins ("Atkins") and William Jones 
abducted Eric Nesbitt. They robbed 
him and then took him to an isolated 
location where he was shot and 
killed with a semi-automatic 
handgun. 
The jury convicted Atkins of 
abduction, armed robbery and 
capital murder. At the penalty phase 
of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on 
testimony of a psychiatric expert 
who concluded that Atkins was 
mildly mentally retarded. 
The jury sentenced Atkins to 
death. The Supreme Court of 
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Virginia affirmed the decision in the 
resentencing hearing and relying on 
the Supreme Court's Penry holding, 
rejected Atkins' argument that he 
was mentally retarded and could not 
be sentenced to death. Because of 
the issue's gravity and the dramatic 
shift in state laws in the past thirteen 
years, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to revisit the issue. The 
Court reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings. 
The Court began with a 
summary of the standard of review 
used to decide whether a 
punishment is excessive under the 
EighthAmendment. Id. at 2246-48. 
The Court noted that for there to be 
justice, it was mandatory that the 
level of punishment for crimes be 
equivalent to the level of the offense. 
Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2246 (citing 
Weem v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349 (1910)). The Court stated that 
instead of using past history to judge 
whether a punishment was 
excessive, it was necessary to look 
at the "evolving standards of 
decency" that reflected a maturing 
society. Id. at 2247 (citing Trap v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 
(1958)). The Court further held that 
objective factors should be used in 
conducting the proportionality 
review under the evolving standards 
of decency, the most reliable and 
objective being the legislation 
enacted by state legislatures. Id. 
In addition, in cases involving a 
consensus, the Court explained that 
it must complete an independent 
evaluation to determine ifthere is 
any reason to disagree with the 
judgment reached by the 
legislatures.ld. at 2247-48. 
The Court then discussed how 
laws passed by state legislatures 
indicated strong public policy 
against the imposition of death on 
mentally retarded offenders. Id. at 
2248-50. After Penry, many state 
legislatures passed laws preventing 
imposition of death on mentally 
retarded defendants. Id. at 2248. 
The Court stated that many states 
passed laws limiting imposition of 
the death penalty, indicating the 
direction of the change in the overall 
views in society. Atkins, 122 S.Ct. 
at 2249. 
The Court explained that 
legislatures passed laws forbidding 
execution of mentally retarded 
offenders, even though anti -crime 
legislation was more popular, which 
indicated society viewed mentally 
retarded offenders as less culpable. 
Id. The Court found further 
evidence that the legislation was 
passed by an overwhelming 
majority of each legislature. Id. 
The Court explained that a final 
indicator of a national consensus 
against execution of mentally 
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retarded offenders was that many 
states that allow execution of 
mentally retarded offenders made 
the practice uncommon. Id. 
The Court then conducted an 
independent evaluation to decide 
whether the popular and legislative 
consensus was proper. Id. at 2250-
52. Although deficiencies of 
mentally retarded offenders did not 
exempt them from criminal 
sanctions, the deficiencies did limit 
personal culpability. Id. at 2250-
51. The Court provided two 
reasons why the legislative 
consensus was proper and mentally 
retarded offenders should be 
excluded from execution because of 
those deficiencies. Atkins, 122 
S.Ct. at 2251. 
First, justification for the death 
penalty would not apply to mentally 
retarded offenders. Id. The Court 
explained that justifications for the 
death penalty were retribution and 
deterrence. Id. In regard to retri-
bution, the severity of punishment 
was dependent on the culpability of 
the offender. Id. According to the 
Court, an exclusion for the mentally 
retarded was appropriate because 
mentally retarded offenders were 
less culpable due to their diminished 
capacities. Id. The Court also 
stated the death penalty was used 
as a deterrent to reduce the chance 
that a criminal would carry out 
murderous conduct as a result of the 
increased severity of punishments. 
Id. The Court held that mentally 
retarded offenders were less likely 
to be deterred by the possibility of 
the death penalty for a crime 
because of their diminished 
33.1 U. Bait L.F. 16 
capacities. Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 
2251. 
Another reason given by the 
Court for approving the consensus 
was that mentally retarded offenders 
face a special risk of wrongful 
execution. Id. at 2251-52. The 
Court noted the possibility of false 
confessions due to the diminished 
capacity of mentally retarded of-
fenders. Id. at 2252. In addition, 
the Court explained that a mentally 
retarded offender would not be able 
to make a persuasive showing of 
mitigation when faced with 
evidence of one or more aggravating 
factors used to impose the death 
penalty. Id. 
The United States Supreme 
Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia 
further limits imposition of the death 
penalty by States because it is now 
unconstitutional to impose the death 
penalty on mentally retarded 
offenders. The decision will lead to 
appeals by many convicts on death 
row who will claim to be mentally 
retarded in order to overturn their 
sentence. In addition, the decision 
limits the power of a judge or jury 
to make a proper sentencing 
decision because mental retardation 
will no longer be a mitigating factor, 
but will be an absolute factor in 
prohibiting the death penalty. The 
decision by the United States 
Supreme Court gives offenders of 
heinous crimes one more loophole 
to avoid the death penalty. 
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